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Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture
NONESTABLISHMENT "UNDER GOD"? THE
NONSECTARIAN PRINCIPLE
STEVEN D. SMITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
T is imprudent to try to do too much in a single lecture, so I want to
attempt one fairly modest (but still, I believe, important) task. I stress
that what follows is not offered as a complete theory of nonestablishment,
much less of the First Amendment. My more modest goal is to try to dis-
entangle three themes that are often conflated with baneful effect. We
can call these the "public secularism principle," the "neutrality principle"
and the "nonsectarian principle."' My own view is that the first two of
these principles have exercised a pernicious influence over First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, but if the third could be extracted so that its own
distinctive virtues could be appreciated, it might provide valuable mooring
for what is at present a deeply disoriented discourse.
As an introduction to this issue, consider the controversial decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Newdow v.
United States Congress,2 declaring the inclusion of the words "under God" in
the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional. The court incurred widespread
criticism for its decision, but even if you believe (as I do) that the result
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. A version
of this lecture was presented in a workshop at the University of San Diego School
of Law, and I thank the participants for their helpful suggestions. The audience at
the Gianella Lecture at Villanova University School of Law raised challenging
questions and objections calling for further reflection, but it seemed best to leave
the lecture itself more or less in the form in which it was delivered.
1. I bow to convention here in referring to these themes as "principles." It
might be better to call them-or at least to call the one I favor here-"ideals,"
"aspirations" or "guiding criteria." If any reader thinks that what I am calling here
the "nonsectarian principle" does not really qualify as a true constitutional "princi-
ple," I will be relieved. Cf STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQuALI-TY. A CRITICAL
DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 62- 82 (2001) (questioning value of
'principles" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
2. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that "under God" violates Establish-
ment Clause and teacher-led recitation of Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitu-
tional), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 386 (2003), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct.
2301 (2004).
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was wrongheaded, this criticism may seem to be a case of blaming the
messenger. After all, the Ninth Circuit merely applied, in a plausible and
faithful way, the doctrines announced by its institutional superior, the
United States Supreme Court. 3 Clear away all of the mostly sophomoric
sophistry and it is pretty straightforward, really. 4 The Supreme Court has
said that government is constitutionally forbidden to endorse religion.
5
The words "under God" endorsed religion when Congress added them to
the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954-indeed, Congress added them partly for
that purpose-and surely, for millions of Americans, they still do. Q.E.D. 6
Of course, one might also argue that the criticism of the decision was
deserved because, as we will see later, the Supreme Court has indicated
that it has no intention of applying the "no endorsement" doctrine in a
plausible and faithful way and that it does not want the doctrine applied in a
plausible and faithful way. 7 So perhaps faithful application of the Su-
preme Court's pronouncements is actually unfaithful to the Supreme
Court's pronouncements. It's hard to say: depending on whether the
Court decides to reach the merits of the case, we may soon find out.8
For present purposes, in any case, we can focus on one of the Newdow
majority's particular assertions:
A profession that we are a nation "under God" is identical, for
Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a na-
tion "under Jesus," a nation "under Vishnu," a nation "under
Zeus," or a nation "under no god," because none of these profes-
sions can be neutral with respect to religion.
9
3. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (ruling
that Establishment Clause prohibits government from endorsing religion).
4. See, e.g., Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that government should not endorse any religion or religious belief).
5. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.
6. For a much more detailed (and, I think, persuasive) argument on this
point, see Steven G. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitu-
tional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1865 (2003).
7. For further discussion of the "no endorsement" doctrine, see infra notes
59-71 and accompanying text.
8. As it turned out, the Supreme Court decided not to reach the merits, but
instead reversed on standing grounds. See Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2312 (reversing
Ninth Circuit decision on grounds that noncustodial parent lacked standing).
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas wrote con-
curring opinions addressing the merits. See id. at 2312-27 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
O'Connor, J., & Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that school district policy
requiring teachers to lead students in reciting Pledge of Allegiance does not vio-
late Establishment Clause). The issue now awaits relitigation by a party with stand-
ing. Because of this disposition of the case, the legal posture of the issue remains
largely unchanged. Accordingly, it seemed possible and appropriate to leave the
lecture largely in the form in which it was delivered. I have, however, added sev-
eral references to the concurring opinions in footnotes.
9. Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003), amended
by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 386 (2003), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
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The court evidently intended this observation as a powerful rhetorical up-
percut-a sort of reductio ad absurdum of the case for keeping "under God"
in the Pledge.
But are these different professions in fact identical? In their actual
content, the professions are obviously far from identical; they may even be
antithetical ("under God," as opposed to "under no god"). Still, depend-
ing on what categories or criteria we are using, we can view the professions
as "identical" in the sense that they fall into the same class or category. If
your consuming interest is "baseball," for example, so that for you the in-
teresting categories for classifying the various things people say are "state-
ments about baseball" and "statements not about baseball," then all of the
professions recited by the court would, thus, fall into the second category:
they are not about baseball. In that sense we might carelessly say that
these statements are "identical." In Newdow, the Ninth Circuit explicitly
assumed an Establishment Clause principle of "neutrality" that effectively
constructed two categories for classifying public professions: "neutral to-
ward religion" and "not neutral toward religion." Within that conceptual
scheme, the court plausibly concluded that all of the professions it listed
were not neutral toward religion-and hence were "identical."
Okay so far. But we can still ask: is this a sensible conceptual scheme?
Many people might feel intuitively that there is a significant difference
among these various statements; so they might wonder about the cogency
of a scheme within which the differences between "under God," "under
Jesus," "under Vishnu" and "under no god" do not even register. In sup-
port of this suspicion, they might observe that under the Ninth Circuit's
approach, many of the most cherished pronouncements in the American
political tradition-including Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, the
Declaration of Independence and (ironically) Jefferson's Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom 1°-would likewise fall into the forbidden category
and hence would need to be banished, or at least expurgated. 1 This con-
clusion seems troublesome. Could it be that the Ninth Circuit's whole
approach-an approach, I reiterate, enjoined upon it by the Supreme
Court-misconceived the constitutional principles at stake?
I think the answer is yes, and I suggest that the error results from
conflating what is a valid and important American tradition of nonsectari-
anism with the quite different notions of secularism and neutrality.
II. THREE PRINCIPLES
Let me start with a rough description of what these three principles
mean. I trust that you will not expect anything definitive; after all, these
terms are often used variously, loosely and (as I have said)
interchangeably.
10. For further discussion, see infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
11. See Steven D. Smith, Law and Cultural Conflict: Barnette's Big Blunder, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 665-66 (2002).
20051
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A. Public Secularism
The principle of "public secularism" is a principle that pervades a
good deal of constitutional discourse and is reflected in modern constitu-
tional doctrine insisting that government must act only for "secular" pur-
poses. 12 The term "secular" is used in different senses, and there is a
perfectly respectable usage which understands "secular" to mean some-
thing like "of or pertaining to this world,"1 3 as opposed to things that per-
tain to some other world or sphere. In this sense, something can easily be
both "secular" and "religious." Thus, historians and others distinguish the
"secular clergy"-the clergy that works in the world, in parishes-from the
"regular clergy" who retreat from the world to the seclusion of a monas-
tery.14 To call parish priests "secular" in no way implies that they have
abandoned their religious vocation. 1
5
If the term "secular" is used in this positive way, then I agree that our
constitutional tradition amply supports the assumption that government is
supposed to act within the realm of the "secular." And occasionally courts
may use the term in this positive sense. For instance, in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 16 the first nativity scene case, the Supreme Court said that a creche
commemorating the birth of Jesus served a "secular" function-it com-
memorated "a significant historical religious event long celebrated in the
Western World."17 At the same time, the Court insisted that this conclu-
sion in no way derogated from the religious quality of the creche.' 8 There
should be nothing especially inflammatory in these claims: Christmas is
widely celebrated in American culture and tradition, and Christmas is typi-
cally linked to the birth of Jesus-as historical an event as the birth of
George Washington or George W. Bush.
Indeed, at a deeper level, and perhaps by accident, the Lynch majority
was also theologically cogent. The birth of Jesus, after all, dramatically
manifests the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, which is precisely the
claim-a deeply and even scandalously "secular" claim-that God came
into and lived within this world not just as an exalted visitor but as a full-
blooded, fully human participant. So if "secular" is used in this inclusive
sense, then whether the cr&che is considered from a cultural or from a
12. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (noting that statute
must have secular legislative purpose).
13. The battered dictionary that I still have from undergraduate days, for in-
stance, gives as its first definition of "secular": "of or relating to the worldly or
temporal." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 1044 (1973).
14. For a further discussion of the evolution of the terms "secular" and "relig-
ious," see JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 12-17 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1994) (examining etymological origins of "secular").
15. See id. at 13 (stating that priests can be both religious and secular)
16. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Id. at 680.
18. See infra note 24.
[Vol. 50: p. I
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more theological perspective, the majority was plainly right to say that it is
a "secular" symbol.
Lynch's critics, however, have routinely failed to grasp this point, and
hence have repeatedly accused the majority of demeaning the cr&he or
denying its religious character.' 9 Because the Lynch majority emphatically
did not say this-on the contrary, it explicitly denied saying or meaning any
such thing20-these critics sometimes resort to quotingJustice Blackmun's
characterization to that effect in his dissent, as if Blackmun were accu-
rately expressing the majority's view. 2 1 That Blackmun understood the
majority better than the majority understood itself seems improbable. So
it all makes you wonder: can these critics read?
But the almost ritual criticism becomes intelligible if we recognize
that the critics are presupposing a different conception of the term "secu-
lar." "Secular," in this usage, means "not religious": "secular" and "relig-
ious" are the poles of a dichotomy. So if Warren Burger said the creche
served a "secular" function, he must have meant that the creche had lost its
religious quality;22 and if he also explicitly denied meaning this, well, then
he must have been merely confused.
It's clear, I think, that someone is confused. But although the critics
may have grossly misread Lynch, I must concede that their usage of "secu-
lar" is more common in modern constitutional discourse. So "secular" is
typically understood by what it is not-that is, not "religion"-rather than
by what it is.
19. Justice Blackmun's characterization was typical: the majority, he charged,
had "relegated [the creche] to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday sea-
son, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning." Lynch,
465 U.S. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
20. See, e.g., id. at 685 n.12 (noting both secular and religious aspects of
creche). The Court noted:
Justice Brennan states that "by focusing on the holiday 'context' in which
the nativity scene [appears], the Court "seeks to explain away the clear
religious import of the creche," and that it has equated the creche with a
Santa's house or reindeer. Of course this is not true.
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also stated:
The city contends that the purposes of the display are "exclusively secu-
lar." We hold only that Pawtucket has a secular purpose for its display,
which is all that Lemon v. Kurtzman requires. Were the test that the gov-
ernment must have "exclusively secular" objectives, much of the conduct
and legislation this Court has approved in the past would have been
invalidated.
Id. at 681 n.6 (citation omitted).
21. See, e.g., WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS ExTRA: RELIG-
IOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 88 (1994) ("Bur-
ger's opinion reduces the meaning of the creche to, injustice Blackmun's words,
'a neutral harbinger of the holiday season.'").
22. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1295 (2d ed.
1988) ("Given the undeniable religious roots of legislative prayers and crZches, the
Court must have meant that those practices, although born of religion, had with
time lost their religious nature.").
2005]
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In sum, the principle of "public secularism," as reflected for instance
in the Lemon v. Kurtzman23 doctrine's "secular purpose" requirement, is
commonly understood to mean that government must refrain from acting
religiously, or for religious purposes, or in support of religion.
B. Neutrality
Next let us consider the principle of "neutrality." Even more notori-
ously than the term "secular," "neutrality" is used in many different
senses: 24 it is, as Justice Harlan observed, a "coat of many colors."25 Its
dominant sense in constitutional discourse, though, seems to be one of
"not taking sides." So government must refrain from taking (or even ap-
pearing to take) a position either for or against "religion." 26 Government
must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not do things that
send messages either endorsing or disapproving religion.
2 7
Just how the principles of "public secularism" and "neutrality"
square-or clash-with each other presents a complicated problem. One
obvious difficulty arises because at least some religious perspectives disap-
prove of public secularism; they regard it as a species of atheism.2 8 So a
secular government will plainly not be neutral with respect to that kind of
religion.29 Another difficulty is that, in some contexts, neutrality is often
taken to mean that "religion"-religious schools or "faith-based organiza-
tions"-may be, or even must be, included among the recipients of gov-
ernmental aid or among the participants in public service programs.
30
Such neutrality-based inclusion creates a tension with a commitment to
keeping government within the domain of the "secular." So one might
conclude that "public secularism" and "neutrality" are at odds with each
other, at least in some contexts, and that courts would have to choose
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. For a critical discussion of some leading versions of neutrality, see STEWVN
D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 77-97 (1995).
25. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (noting that Establishment Clause "prohibits government from appear-
ing to take a position on questions of religious belief").
27. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
28. See, e.g., JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., THE PROBLEM OF GOD, YESTERDAY
AND TODAY 99 (1964) ("Atheism is the public philosophy, established by law. The
establishment was accomplished by the law of separation of church and
state .... ").
29. Of course, some religious perspectives also disapprove of neutrality-
which is the source of a similar conundrum for the neutrality principle itself. See,
e.g., SMITH, supra note 24, at 81-88.
30. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995); cf
Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (holding that states have "play in the
joints" in deciding whether or not to include religion in general assistance
programs).
[Vol. 50: p. 1
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between them. Which is it-"secularism" or "neutrality"? Indeed, this ten-
sion is easily visible in, for example, the resistance of more separationist
justices to the neutrality theme in some school aid or school voucher
cases.
3 1
Still, the dominant understanding in modern religion clause jurispru-
dence-I am merely reporting, not commending-seems to view these
principles not merely as compatible but as entailing each other, or even as
merely different labels for, or dimensions of, the same basic principle.
Government must be religiously "neutral," and it maintains its neutrality
by being "secular." Or government must be "secular," and this restriction
entails that government must be religiously "neutral."3 2
C. Nonsectarianism
We have looked at "public secularism" and "neutrality;" so then what
would a "nonsectarian" principle contemplate? I have already noted that
the "nonsectarian" theme is often conflated with the others that I have
mentioned. And it is not hard to see how this might happen. Suppose we
take the term "sectarian," as people sometimes do, to be a rough synonym
for "religious." Then "nonsectarian" comes to mean "not religious." "Not
religious," as we have seen, is the dominant modern meaning of "secular."
So a "nonsectarian" state would by this understanding necessarily be a
"secular" state. And by whatever logic, or abuse thereof, the modem un-
derstanding has come to equate public "secularism" with "neutrality,"
"nonsectarian" thus would become equivalent to "neutral."
The principles can be viewed as a unified bundle, and I suspect they
often are viewed in this way. Indeed, I suspect that the "neutrality" and
"public secularism" principles gain much of their appeal by presenting
themselves as restatements of the "nonsectarian" principle. But "nonsec-
tarian" also can have (and more naturally or conventionally does have) an
importantly different meaning-a meaning that is potentially valuable and
hence should not be squandered by lumping it into an undifferentiated
secularism or neutrality.
So I will observe that the term "sect" is typically not taken to be synony-
mous with "religion." Rather, it refers to one specific denomination or
party picked from a set of many denominations or parties. Often "sect"
connotes not merely a single religious party, but a narrowly self-defining
and inward-looking party.33
31. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. For further discussion of the rationale for and relations between these
themes, see Steven D. Smith, The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the
Law of Religious Freedom, 10 LEGAL THEORY 51, 55-66 (2004).
33. See WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DIcrIONARY, supra note 13, at 1044 (defin-
ing "sect" as "dissenting or schismatic religious body; esp.: one regarded as ex-
treme or heretical"). For the noun "sectarian," two definitions are offered: "an
adherent of a sect" and "a narrow or bigoted person." Id.
2005]
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In this sense, "sectarian" would describe the kind of religion that is
narrow, exclusive or inward-looking. Conversely, "nonsectarian" would not
mean "nonreligious" or "secular." Rather, it would describe a position or
attitude that engages with issues affecting religion in an inclusive or ecumeni-
cal spirit. A nonsectarian approach would emphasize and appeal to what
different "sects" share with each other and with nonreligious parties and
perspectives.
Taken in this entirely familiar sense, "nonsectarian" cannot be "ei-
ther/or" or "once-and-for-all." Though the disciples of "public reason"
may try to wish the fact away, in the world we inhabit it is rarely possible
for the state to act on beliefs that everyone shares. Consequently, "nonsec-
tarian" is of necessity a term of degree: it is more like terms such as
"bright," "small" or "quick" than it is like qualities such as "pregnant," "col-
lege graduate" or "registered voter," qualities that in their conventional
usage, one usually either has or does not have. The degree to which a
measure is "nonsectarian" will vary with context: a position that might
seem indisputably "nonsectarian" in one time and place-in a nineteenth
century New England town, for example, in which nearly everyone may
have been some variety of Protestant-will seem less so when other-
minded believers enter the picture.
Taken as a potential constitutional principle, therefore, "nonsectai-
anism" could not be a sort of "all-or-nothing" command with a concrete
meaning that stays constant over time and place. Instead, it would need to
be understood more as an admonition to be as inclusive as circumstances
permit, or to avoid gratuitous and potentially divisive religious specificity.
I will try to clarify the notion of nonsectarianism further as this paper
proceeds. First, though, we can consider some reasons why a nonsectarian
principle might be attractive.
III. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE NONSECTARIAN PRINCIPLE
We have seen that, contrary to common usage, the nonsectarian prin-
ciple is significantly different than the public secularism and neutrality
principles. Still, the fact that they are often conflated suggests that there
are family resemblances. In particular, all three principles have a com-
mon purpose: they seek to promote the goal of an inclusive community in
a pluralistic society.
34
34. The goal of an inclusive community is manifest in judicial discussions of
the "no endorsement" doctrine-the purpose of the doctrine, the Justices say, is to
prevent citizens from feeling like "outsiders." See County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (plurality opinion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597,
608 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining decision to strike "under God" from Pledge),
amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 386 (2003), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301
(2004).
[Vol. 50: p. I
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This is, to be sure, a laudable purpose, and all three principles at-
tempt to serve it. How then should we choose among them? This section
of the paper offers three reasons for preferring the nonsectarian princi-
ple. These reasons probably overlap to a considerable extent; even so, I
think they serve to highlight different aspects of the case for nonsectarian-
ism. We might, for simplicity, refer to these reasons as the arguments
from tradition, from political viability and from candor.
A. Tradition
The first argument observes that there is a strong theme of non-
sectarianism in revered parts of the American constitutional tradition.
3 5
For present purposes, we might look specifically at two prominent exam-
ples. Consider first Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
36
-
probably this country's seminal enactment on the subject of religious free-
dom. The Bill begins by proclaiming that "Almighty God hath created the
mind free," and it goes on to assert that compulsion in matters of religion
represents "a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion,
who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by
coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do."3 7 This is overtly,
even aggressively, religious language; it hardly seems consistent with a pub-
lic posture of nonreligious "secularism," or of "neutrality" toward religion.
But the phrase "Almighty God" also resulted from the defeat of an attempt
in committee to specify that the "lord both of body and mind" was Jesus
Christ.38 Jefferson's language can thus be classified as "nonsectarian," be-
cause it attempted to appeal to premises that most citizens of the time
could accept.
As a second example, consider Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address-
a stunningly profound statement which a London newspaper described at
the time as "the noblest political document known to history."3 9 Lincoln's
speech is pervasively religious; it is, as one commentator observed, a "theo-
logical classic," containing within its twenty-five sentences "fourteen refer-
ences to God, many scriptural allusions, and four direct quotations from
the Bible." 40 Its religious appeal is all the more powerful because it was
35. For a useful quick summary of evidence for this claim, see Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 632-36 (1992) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (surveying history of Establish-
ment Clause). For a more detailed and careful exposition, emphasizing the devel-
opment of the nonsectarian principle in the nineteenth century, see Noah
Feldman, Nonsectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65 (2002).
36. Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in
THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 25-26 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988).
37. See id. at 25.
38. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY- THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 75 (1998) (discussing debate surrounding Bill's
language).
39. ELTON TRUEBLOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THEOLOGIAN OF AMERICAN
ANGUISH 137 (1973).
40. Id. at 135-36.
2005]
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not the slick product of professional speech writers, but rather the expres-
sion of a lifetime of intense, often agonized reflection. Nonetheless, the
speech carefully refrains from taking any narrowly sectarian position. Its
nonsectarian attitude is not only performative, but is explicitly articulated.
Americans of very different views, Lincoln observed, had "read the same
Bible, and pray[ed] to the same God."4 1 The speech carefully avoided
placing blame entirely on one side or faction. And the speech culminated
with Lincoln's famous exhortation that Americans go forward "[w] ith mal-
ice toward none; with charity for all... with firmness in the right as God
gives us to see the right."4 2
These instances of nonsectarianism could easily be multiplied. And
there is plenty of recent evidence, including President Bush's speeches to
the nation immediately following the September 11 tragedy quoting scrip-
ture and imploring Americans to join with him in prayer. No lengthy re-
hearsal of the evidence seems necessary, because the conclusion seems
inescapable. The "secularism" and "neutrality" principles are embarrassed
by the fact of repeated, constant and explicit public endorsements and
invocations of religion, beginning before the Constitution was adopted
and continuing to the present day. By contrast, there is a long-standing,
though imperfectly honored, American tradition of seeking to keep gov-
ernment and its expressions as nonsectarian as circumstances permit.
4 3
Thus, the nonsectarian principle, unlike its competitors that often try to
piggyback on it, can claim strong support in our constitutional tradition.
B. Political Viability
Though the nonsectarian principle is more securely grounded in our
tradition than its competitors, this fact will strike some people as a dubious
recommendation. For a nation born in the Enlightenment, tradition has
always been at best a suspect category. 44 But a related point can be made
in terms of political viability. Arguably, many of our most central constitu-
41. SMITH, supra note 1, at 181.
42. Id. at 182-83. As it happens, Lincoln was superbly, perhaps uniquely, qual-
ified to expound and reflect the nonsectarian position because this was his own
hard-won view. See id. at 177-78 (discussing Lincoln's religious background).
Throughout his life, Lincoln struggled with religious questions; he pored over the
Bible, talked with religionists of various stripes and often attended their services.
See id. at 178 (discussing Lincoln's religious practices). But he was unable to em-
brace any particular sect. See id. His elusive stance has been susceptible to various
interpretations; but, amidst the uncertainties, we can confidently say that Lincoln's
faith was both deep and nonsectarian. See id. at 177-84 (discussing Lincoln's relig-
ious beliefs).
43. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604 (1989) (plurality
opinion) ("The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous
examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity specifically.").
44. See Donald W. Livingston, The Founding and the Enlightenment: Two Theories
of Sovereignty, in VITAL REMNANTS: AMERICA'S FOUNDING AND THE WESTERN TRADi-
TION 243, 244 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 1999) (stating that "[t]radition is the great
horror of the Enlightenment").
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tional commitments are grounded in religious values or premises. At least
according to one widely held and plausible view, religion did not merely
provide the vocabulary in which these commitments were articulated; it
was and is part of their very logic. Consequently, a principle that forbids
governmental invocation of religion may have the effect of rendering us
tongue-tied when it comes to explaining our most basic political commit-
ments. And muteness on the most basic matters is not a promising foun-
dation for enduring political community.
Consider, for instance, the commitment to equality. The Declaration
of Independence asserts as one of the central truths on which the Repub-
lic was founded that "all men are created equal."45 Likewise, in the Gettys-
burg Address, Lincoln recited this claim, stating that the nation was
founded on the basis of a dedication to that proposition. 46 In recent de-
cades, equality has become arguably the central value in some of our most
justly celebrated political movements (in particular the civil rights move-
ment), in a good deal of political philosophy and also in much constitu-
tional law, not only under the Equal Protection Clause, but in First
Amendment jurisprudence as well. 47 Yet this assertion of equality or equal
worth, ennobling and exhilarating though it may be, is not on its face
intuitively compelling or even plausible.
Thus, George Fletcher observes that "[a ] s a descriptive claim, the the-
sis that 'all men are created equal' is obviously false. People differ in every
conceivable respect-size, strength, intelligence, musical talent, beauty."
48
So then what is the justification for saying that all persons are in some
important sense of equal worth? The Declaration of Independence is
quite clear in offering a religious foundation for the doctrine of equality:
we "are created" equal, and we are equal at least in the sense that we "are
endowed by [our] Creator" with rights. 4 9 Thus, as Fletcher explains,
"[b]ehind those created equal stands a Creator-the source as well of our
basic human rights."50 .
Perhaps the commitment to equality can be defended today on purely
nonreligious grounds-but perhaps not. In a recent book, Jeremy Wal-
dron argues thatJohn Locke's commitment to equality was firmly based in
religious assumptions, and that modern efforts to support the commit-
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
46. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
47. See William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?: An Assessment of the
Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND.
L.J. 193, 203 (2000) (describing "the equality of ideas principle that lies at the
heart of the Free Speech Clause" and explaining that "[t]he equality of ideas prin-
ciple posits that every idea has equal dignity in the competition for acceptance in
the marketplace of ideas").
48. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDE-
FINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 95 (2001).
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id.
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ment on purely secular assumptions have not succeeded to this point.5 1
Waldron's concluding observations sound faintly ominous:
[M]aybe the notion of humans as one another's equals will begin
to fall apart, under pressure, without the presence of the relig-
ious conception that shaped it .... Locke believed this general
acceptance [of equality] was impossible apart from the princi-
ple's foundation in religious teaching. We believe otherwise.
Locke, I suspect, would have thought we were taking a risk. And
I am afraid it is not entirely clear, given our experience of a
world and a century in which politics and public reason have cut
loose from these foundations, that his cautions and suspicions
were unjustified.5 2
The same may be said, arguably, of our foundational commitment to
human rights. This commitment seems central to our constitutional or-
der, and once again, our seminal statement of that commitment justifies it
on a religious premise: our inalienable rights are those with which we are
"endowed by [our] Creator."53 We have seen, of course, a variety of ef-
forts to justify human rights on nonreligious grounds, but the success of
these efforts is doubtful.5 4 Often rights are linked to something like
"human dignity," but both this quality itself and its capacity to generate
"rights" remain obscure. In any case, the appeal to dignity may only push
the question back a step because, as Mary Ann Glendon observes, "[m]ost
[religious] believers ... would say that dignity is grounded in the fact that
human beings are made in the image and likeness of God."55 In a similar
vein, Michael Perry has argued that the idea of human rights is "inelimin-
ably religious." 56 I have argued for a similar conclusion on quite different
grounds.5 7
All of these questions are hotly contested, of course, and I certainly
do not pretend to have demonstrated here that our commitments to
equality and to rights necessarily rest on a religious foundation. This is
what I think I can safely say: first, our commitments to equality and to
rights were, as a historical matter, justified on religious premises; second,
51. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LocKE, AND EQUALIY: CHRISTIAN
FOUNDATIONS IN LocKE's POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).
52. Id. at 243.
53. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
54. For one familiar expression of skepticism, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69-70 (2d ed. 1984) (concluding that natural
or human rights are fictitious because attempts to justify existence of such rights
have failed).
55. Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business,
44 AM.J. JuRIs. 1, 13 (1999).
56. See MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RrGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-41
(1998).
57. See Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE
SCHLAG & STEVEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE LAW 100 (1996).
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many people today still accept these commitments on religious grounds;
and finally, at least some thinkers believe that the commitments cannot be
justified except on religious grounds. I concede that those who hold this
view (and I include myself in the group) might be wrong. Even so, by
inhibiting us as a public matter from reaffirming and relying on those
grounds, the secularism and neutrality principles subtly place at risk the
viability of our constitutional enterprise over the long haul.
C. Candor
This observation leads to my third reason for preferring the nonsec-
tarian principle: it allows for the possibility of candor. Proponents of a
constitutional principle do not offer it simply as a good idea or as the
political position they happen to find attractive; instead, they introduce
the principle with phrases like "the Constitution requires." And this presenta-
tion typically calls for some attempt to reconcile the preferred principle
with long-standing constitutional practices and precedents. If a principle
is in fact contrary to our tradition, that attempt will usually call for some
amount of, shall we say, artful pleading. And if the principle is also con-
trary to current practices that neither the polity nor the Justices are eager
to relinquish, then further (usually not very artistic) artfulness will be
called for in the attempt to explain why, contrary to first impressions (and
second impressions, and third impressions), the principle does not re-
quire that these practices be eliminated after all. These efforts, however,
can strain the discourse. At some point, the deceptiveness becomes so
transparent that the discourse loses all credibility; "everyone knows" that
the courts cannot really mean what they are forced, over and over again,
to say. 58
There is ample reason to believe that the constitutional discourse of
religious freedom has for some time persisted in approximately this condi-
tion. The evidence for this claim is abundant, but for the moment it may
be enough to cite the layers of obfuscation that have arisen-of necessity, I
think-around the modem "no endorsement" doctrine, which figured
centrally in the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision.
59
The problem arises because the Justices-or several of them, any-
way-find irresistible the proposition that government should not make
anyone feel like an "outsider" by endorsing religion. But these same Jus-
tices also are not prepared to declare "free exercise exemptions" for relig-
ious objectors unconstitutional; nor are they about to rule that the
national motto, "In God We Trust," violates the Constitution, nor thatJef-
ferson, Madison and the Founders transgressed a prospective constitu-
58. Though the competition is heated, probably the leading example by now,
not available at the time the lecture was given, is Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Elk Grove. See generally Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.
Ct. 2301, 2321-27 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. For further discussion of the holding in Allegheny, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
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tional principle when they wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom and the Declaration of Independence, nor that Lincoln violated
the Constitution in his Second Inaugural Address or in his Gettysburg Ad-
dress (which of course contained the same words that the Ninth Circuit
recently found offensive: "one nation under God"), nor that George W.
Bush violated the Constitution in his September 11th speeches. So, how
do we square these seemingly incompatible inclinations?
As a first step, we might draw a distinction between the endorsement of
religion and the accommodation of religion.60 "Accomodation" is supposed
to allow for free exercise exemptions. But this distinction reflects a false
dichotomy: it is reminiscent of the student who says, "I didn't skip class; I
just stayed home." Many people and many causes would like to be accom-
modated by the law-to be exempted from the draft, for instance, or from
other burdensome laws. If we single out religious objectors to accommo-
date them while declining various other objectors, it is hard not to discern
a kind of endorsement of religion in that selective accommodation.
And in any case, this distinction (or a similar distinction between en-
dorsing and acknowledging religion 61 ) would not excuse what appear to be
explicit governmental statements favorable to or approving of religion
(such as the national motto). Thus; further qualifications are needed.
Why is it not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion to put "In God
We Trust" on all of the nation's dimes and quarters and nickels? Why is it
not a violation to begin sessions of the Supreme Court with the ringing
plea "God save the United States and this Honorable Court"?
Well, the Justices explain, those expressions serve the purposes of
"solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in soci-
ety."62 Maybe, but it seems we are piling up the false dichotomies. "God
save the United States" is not the sort of expression that either endorses
religion or solemnizes a public occasion; it plainly does both. Indeed, it
solemnizes precisely by invoking God's blessing, thereby endorsing
religion.
So the Justices add that these expressions have "lost through rote rep-
etition any significant religious content."63 And if skeptics point out that
many real people still do perceive religious content in words like "In God
We Trust," the Justices visit one final indignity upon us: they explain that
for these constitutional purposes it is not real people whose perceptions
60. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
61. See Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2322, 2325-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
63. Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also Elk Grove,
124 S. Ct. at 2323 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693
(O'Connor, J., concurring)) (stating that religious content is adequately absent
when practice is of such age and common.use to be fairly called ubiquitous).
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count. Rather, what matters is whether a "reasonable" or "objective" ob-
server would perceive a message of endorsement. 64
This last embellishment on the "no endorsement" doctrine seems at
once inevitable and deeply perverse. A doctrine that begins with the laud-
able objective of preventing anyone from feeling like an outsider on the
basis of religion culminates in a construction that tells those offended by
what they sincerely perceive to be a religious or anti-religious message not
only that the message is legitimate, but that their perception to the con-
trary does not count because they are not "reasonable" observers. The
doctrine sets out to remove injury, but instead merely adds insult.
Still, it is important to see that this "reasonable observer" test is a nat-
ural, probably necessary, corollary to the "no endorsement" doctrine. The
"reasonable observer" technique may seem disingenuous, but I suspect
that everyone who favors the "no endorsement" test will have to resort to it
at some point. For example, you may be among the significant minority of
citizens who are perfectly willing to honor the perceptions of actual citi-
zens by striking "under God" from the Pledge, or "In God We Trust" from
coins.65 You may dismiss with contempt the Justices' explanation that a
"reasonable" observer would see no endorsement of religion in these ex-
pressions. And you may be willing to say, on the same grounds, that
George W. Bush routinely violates a constitutional principle in his official,
presidential speeches (as probably every President before him has
done)-and that Lincoln, Madison and even the greatJefferson deviated
from constitutional principle when they invoked deity not just as private
persons, but in their official expressions. 66 Okay so far. But I think we
can treat it as almost axiomatic that in a country as religiously diverse as
this one, virtually anything government does will be perceived by someone
as endorsing or disapproving of religion. 67 So, to borrow a far-fetched
example from Justice Stevens, what do you say to the person who thinks
that an "exotic cow" in the national zoo conveys "the government's ap-
64. See Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
relevant viewpoint for Establishment Clause is of reasonable observer "fully cogni-
zant of the history, ubiquity and context of the practice in question").
65. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2173-74 (1996).
66. Andrew Koppelman suggests that "Smith's attack on the public/private
distinction notwithstanding, things can be said in a president's inaugural address
that cannot be said in a statute. An officeholder making a speech can invoke God,
but it is inappropriate and unconstitutional for a legislature to do so in a statute."
Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78
Cm.-KNrr L. Rav. 729, 733 n.27 (2003). Even without attacking or doubting the
public-private distinction, however, it is not easy to see how a speech given by a
President at a public ceremony at which he is being inaugurated as President can
be classified as mere "private" expression.
67. Cf Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Given the
dizzying religious heterogeneity of our Nation, adopting a subjective approach
would reduce the [endorsement] test to an absurdity. Nearly any government ac-
tion could be overturned as a violation of the Establishment Clause . . ").
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proval of the Hindu religion"?68 Or, to Douglas Laycock, who has sug-
gested that, at least in principle, the names of cities like Los Angeles or
Corpus Christi are unconstitutional endorsements of religion?69 Or, to
use a much more realistic and recurring example, you may think that pub-
lic Christmas displays-including creches-just do endorse Christianity,
and that Justice O'Connor's claim that a "reasonable" observer would not
see it this way (at least if there are enough Santas and elves around) bor-
ders on insulting.7 0 But then what do you say to all of those citizens who
protest that removing the creche is "taking Christ out of Christmas" and
thereby expressing a message of hostility toward Christianity? At some
point, I suspect, all of us will be forced to resort to the Court's "reasonable
observer" device. "You may perceive it that way," we will say, "but a reasona-
ble observer wouldn't. You're just being obtuse. Get a life."
Or at least we will be forced to say something like this if we continue
to insist that the Constitution commands government to be secular and
religiously neutral, thereby prohibiting government from saying or doing
things that endorse or disapprove of religion. And that of course is the
point: these (admittedly quite alluring and well-intended) principles are
so radically inconsistent with the reality of our political traditions and cur-
rent practices that they can only be maintained by multiplying spurious
dichotomies and transparent fictions, until the discourse becomes ram-
pantly incredible. Modern First Amendment discourse inures us to such
deceptions until, properly educated, we can believe-or at least say---six
impossible things before breakfast without batting an eye. 7 1
68. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
70. Mark Tushnet observes that Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the Paw-
tucket creche did not endorse religion "came as a surprise to most Jews." Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 711-12 n.52 (1986).
Leo Pfeffer asserts that the creche was offensive not only to Jews but also to the
National Council of Churches, Baptists, Unitarians and to Ethical Culturalists and
secularists. See LEO PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 120 (1984).
71. See LEwIS CARROLL, Through the Looking-Glass, in THE WORKS OF LEWIS CAR-
ROLL 111, 163 (Roger Lancelyn Green ed., Spring Books 1965). Carroll writes:
"Let's consider your age to begin with-how old are you?"
"I'm seven and a half, exactly."
"You needn't say 'exactly'," the Queen remarked. "I can believe it without
that. Now I'll give you something to believe. I'm just one hundred and
one, five months and a day."
"I ca'n't believe that!" said Alice.
"Ca'n't you?" the Queen said in a pitying tone. "Try again: draw a long
breath and shut your eyes."
Alice laughed. "There's no use trying," she said, "one ca'n't believe impos-
sible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was
your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why sometimes I've be-
lieved as many as six impossible things before breakfast."
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It is a virtue of the nonsectarian principle, I think, that it does not
demand this sacrifice of us. The nonsectarian principle permits us-
though, of course, it does not compel us-to be honest.
To be sure, honesty has-its costs. In particular, the nonsectarian prin-
ciple permits candor about one disquieting but inescapable reality: gov-
ernment often cannot be neutral among conflicting beliefs-not even
among conflicting religious beliefs. Government cannot avoid treating
some citizens on some occasions as "outsiders" or "second class citizens"-
at least if those notions are used in the unnecessary and unfortunate sense
in which the modern decisions use them. The governing of a political
community necessarily involves judgments and beliefs, and in a large and
diverse community some of those judgments and beliefs will inevitably be
controversial. Further, many of those controversies will have a religious
dimension (at least for many citizens). So the best we can hope for, to
paraphrase Lincoln, is that the government might act on beliefs that are
acceptable to some of the people all of the time and all of the people
some of the time. But it simply will not be able to act on beliefs that are
acceptable to all of the people all of the time. And the sooner we admit
this painful fact, the sooner we may be able to begin to develop a more
mature and realistic First Amendment discourse-and a more honest self-
understanding.
IV. APPLYING NONSECTARIANISM
But what would a nonsectarian principle mean in practice? I hope
that the previous discussion has already shed some light on that question,
both through general explanation of the principle and through the two
historical examples I have mentioned-namely, Jefferson's Virginia Stat-
ute for Religious Freedom and Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. Still,
further clarification and a more contemporary application may help illus-
trate the principle.
Let me begin by reiterating that the nonsectarian principle is not an
"either/or" formula that we can simply slap down on any challenged ex-
pression or practice extracted from its context and then conclude that the
expression or practice is or is not "nonsectarian." The principle is one of
degree and context. It urges government to be as ecumenical and inclu-
sive as its purposes and the circumstances permit. At least within the do-
main of the "secular" in its positive sense, 7 2 government is not forbidden
to act on religious beliefs or to make religious expressions. Government
should avoid acting on religion, however, in ways that are unnecessarily or
gratuitously narrow or exclusionary.
72. See supra notes 13 -15 and accompanying text.
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A. Caveats
Could we borrow the standard terminology of constitutional doctrine
and say that the "nonsectarian" principle means that government should
not invoke religion except as "necessary" for some legitimate purpose? I
would accept this formulation with two important caveats. First, it would
be imprudent, I think, to hobble the principle with the sort of cheap,
mechanical "rationalism" that so often appears in constitutional decisions
and that Robert Nagel has so persuasively criticized.73 To put the point
differently, like other constitutional principles, this one is best imple-
mented with the support of a Burkean sensibility that understands that in
the maintenance of a complex political and cultural order, it is a grave
misunderstanding to suppose that we can assess any particular measure by
simply ticking off two or three discrete objectives or "interests" that the
measure is supposed to achieve and then asking whether the measure is
indispensable in achieving those interests. History and culture are more
subtle and interconnected than that.
Second, and relatedly, in this context, "necessary" would need to be
understood in approximately the sense thatJohn Marshall famously elabo-
rated in M'Culloch v. Maryland,74 and for much the same reason. "Neces-
sary," that is, cannot be taken to mean that some particular means is
"absolutely" or "indispensably" necessary in its particularity, because no
particular means or expression will satisfy that test-but means and ex-
pressions are necessary. There is more than one way for me to return
home to San Diego from here-I could go by car, bus, train or plane-so
no particular means of transportation is strictly necessary; still, I do need
to select one of these methods, and whichever one I select will be a partic-
ular one. In a similar vein, Marshall explained that in deciding whether
an exercise of congressional power is "necessary," it would be a fallacy to
imagine that we could mean "absolutely" necessary. This is because, in
most cases, more than one means of pursuing an objective is possible and
we would thereby prevent ourselves from adopting any means at all.
Public expressions of reasons-for a particular measure, such as Jef-
ferson's Virginia Bill or the Declaration of Independence, or for a more
general attitude of loyalty, as in the Pledge of Allegiance-have this same
quality, I think. Usually no particular expression will be absolutely neces-
sary when considered in isolation. But our form of government, resting
heavily on the consent of the governed, depends on a tradition of public
reason-giving-both for specific public actions and for general support of
the government. And in deciding whether any particular reasons are "nec-
essary," we would do well to be guided byJohn Marshall's observation that
a means should be considered "necessary" if it is "appropriate" and
"plainly adapted" to its end.
73. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 106-20 (1989).
74. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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In assessing particular expressions of reasons, these inquiries impli-
cate not only the intellectual but also the cultural dimensions of a particu-
lar controversy. Suppose you ask why you should not cheat on your tax
filings and, knowing that you are a committed utilitarian, I nonetheless
respond to your question with a careful Kantian explanation: even if this
reason satisfies some abstract test of philosophical adequacy, it still will not
be a reason that speaks to you. In the same way, in our practice of public
reason-giving, the adequacy of a reason will depend not only on its co-
gency as an abstract intellectual matter but also on its resonance with the
beliefs actually present in the American political community. Take Jeffer-
son's well-known statement that the "only firm basis" for liberties is "a con-
viction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of
God."75 Jefferson's claim may or may not be correct as a universal pro-
position or as a philosophical matter; but even if it is not correct, it still
might be a cogent report on the condition of rights in the American cul-
tural context.
These caveats lead me to acknowledge a feature of the nonsectarian
principle that some people will see as a damning deficiency, but that I
regard as a major virtue: properly understood, the principle is not condu-
cive to an aggressive judicial role in policing the practices of American
governments for Establishment Clause violations. It would be incorrect to
say that the principle precludes anyjudicial oversight. If you are like other
audiences, you will easily be able to challenge me with hypothetical exam-
ples of actions that would obviously violate a nonsectarian principle, and
that a court could accordingly enjoin. For example: "what if the City
Council voted to allocate half of its budget to the erection of a 100-foot
high golden statute ofJesus in the town square?" And so forth. Still, cases
as clear as this will probably be rare. And if the nonsectarian principle is
applied in actual cases with the Burkean sensibility that I have alluded
to, 7 6 and with a M'Culloch sense of "necessity," then a responsible court
would be reluctant to pronounce some particular measure invalid, espe-
cially if it has been woven into the texture of a community's culture or
institutions.
The principle is thus best understood as an aspiration for the commu-
nity as a whole-one that contemplates sparing judicial enforcement,
much in the same way that M'Culloch itself contemplated sparing judicial
enforcement of the Constitution's principle of "enumerated powers."
This consequence of the principle will be troublesome for those who have
great confidence in the judgments of courts combined with a serious dis-
trust of our nonjudicial institutions, or of the American people them-
75. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 23, 215 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
76. Obviously, the principle would not have to be applied with such sensibili-
ties. Courts can actively apply even extremely nebulous standards, such as "undue
burden."
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selves. I have discussed the issue elsewhere, 7 7 but for now I will merely
acknowledge the consequence and observe that, in my view, our history
and modern experience give no adequate grounds for this combination of
confidence and distrust. Moreover, if those attitudes are in fact justified,
then I doubt that there is much hope that government "of the people, by
the people, for the people" can "long endure."
B. Jefferson's Statute Revisited
With these explanations, we can return to Jefferson's Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom to illustrate the nonsectarian principle a bit more
closely before considering a more current example. As noted, the act be-
gan by asserting that "Almighty God created the mind free," and it pro-
ceeded to elaborate on this rationale for religious freedom. I have already
noted that this invocation of deity was neither "secular" in the dominant
modern sense nor religiously neutral; but it was "nonsectarian," at least in
contrast to more specifically Christian language that some legislators pre-
ferred. So we can imagine a more sectarian version using such Christian
language: "Christ the Lord created the mind free." And it is even possible
that a majority of Virginians were Christians and that, given the choice,
they would have voted for the more sectarian version. Even so, the Chris-
tian language would have been gratuitous. Christians believed in "Al-
mighty God," after all, and the language of "Almighty God" fully conveyed
the rationale for rights. So there was no good reason to limit the rationale
to Christians.
Conversely, there may well have been Virginians who found even the
more nonsectarian version offensive: they may not have believed in God,
for example, or they may not have believed that God created the mind
free. So why not delete the religious rationale altogether, we might ask,
and substitute a purely secular rationale? Given the beliefs of Virginians of
the time, however, it may be that no nonreligious rationale could have
commanded anything approaching the level of assent that the religious
rationale could.
In short, the more Christian rationale would have been gratuitously
exclusive, while a nonreligious rationale (though more acceptable to
some) might not have served the purpose. If so, then the nonsectarian
rationale alluding to "Almighty God" may have been "necessary," in a
M'Culloch sense, to the purpose of the statute.
V. UNDER GOD? UNDER VISHNU?
This brings us back to the Pledge of Allegiance, and the words "under
God." Although it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court will eventu-
ally uphold these words by invoking one of the spurious distinctions men-
77. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215,
260-67 (2002).
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tioned earlier and denying that the words send any message endorsing
religion,7 8 few people will find this explanation believable. To most peo-
ple I know, "God" is closely associated with religion, so the assertion that
something is "under God" seems quite religious. But that fact alone
should not invalidate the words. Rather, the question ought to be whether
the words comply with the nonsectarian principle. Are they unnecessarily
or gratuitously religious in an exclusive sense, relative to the purpose of the
Pledge?
Given the reaction to the Newdow decision, I think we can fairly infer
that a sizable majority of Americans prefer to have the words "under God"
in the Pledge. Moreover, survey evidence shows that an overwhelming ma-
jority of Americans believe in God. These facts are relevant to the ques-
tion I have posed, but they are not decisive. Conversely, critics of the
words can point out that they are not strictly "necessary." We could have a
Pledge without those words; indeed, until 1954 we did have a Pledge with-
out the words. That fact is also relevant to our question, but not decisive.
The central question, once again, is whether the words are "neces-
sary," in a M'Culloch sense, to the purpose of the Pledge. That purpose, I
take it, is to evoke and express loyalty on the part of citizens to the sort of
republic succinctly described in the Pledge. Is it an important feature of
that republic that it is "under God"? Obviously, citizens disagree about
this question in a variety of ways. Some may grant, as a purely descriptive
and historical matter, that there is a long tradition (running from Wash-
ington to Jefferson and Madison to Lincoln to George W. Bush) of using
theistic rhetoric in official and ceremonial pronouncements; and yet they
may doubt that "under God" has truly been essential to Americans' con-
ception of their Republic. Others may think that theistic foundations have
been a central part of the American political tradition, but that we are by
now mature enough to discard this objectionable element. 79 Still others
may think that an America unwilling to acknowledge publicly and officially
that it is "under God" would no longer command their serious allegiance.
Or, for reasons alluded to earlier in the discussion of equality, they may
think that bereft of our public commitment to a higher source, the foun-
dations of our Republic would be arbitrary and fragile.80
Though I am inclined to the latter view, I will not argue for it here. 8 1
Instead, I will limit myself to two observations. First, the historical se-
quence of explicitly adding (or subtracting) words is relevant to this ques-
tion, but not in any straightforward or simplistic sense. Adding words to a
78. Justice O'Connor advocated this course in Elk Grove (though of course she
did not put the point in quite this way). See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2321-27 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79. Cf JOHN RAWLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131, 152-54 (1999).
80. See Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX.
REv. L. & POL. 41, 52-69 (2003).
81. See generally Steven D. Smith, Recovering (From) Enlightenment?, 41 SAN D1-
EGO L. REv. 1263 (2004).
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recitation or creed may change its meaning. Conversely, the addition may
merely make explicit what was all along understood, but in a changed con-
text in which failure to add the words would reflect a change in meaning.
Suppose that you have not been in the habit of explicitly saying that you
love your spouse-you are the strong, silent type, maybe, and in any case
the fact has seemed too obvious to need saying-but then a situation arises
in which your commitment is seriously called into question. Saying "I love
you" at this point might merely make explicit what was all along under-
stood and went "without saying." Conversely, an omission to say the words
in this context might indicate a major change in what had previously been
understood. The words "under God" were explicitly added to the Pledge
in 1954 in an effort to distinguish the American community from Commu-
nist foes. 82 Given the long history of such pronouncements and the fact
that the phrase "under God" echoes Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, how-
ever, I think it would be hard to argue that its addition reflected any revi-
sion in the American self-understanding. It seems far more plausible to
suppose that taking the words out would be the revisionary gesture.
Second, to return to the argument from Newdow with which we began,
I think we can be confident in saying that, whether or not the words
.under God" are unnecessarily exclusive, they are emphatically not identi-
cal, from the perspective of the nonsectarian principle, to "under Jesus,"
"under Vishnu" or "under no god."8 3 From this perspective, whether
these statements are "identical" is not something that can be determined
by extracting them from their cultural context and measuring the dena-
tured remainders against an abstract standard like "neutrality." Instead,
we need to consider them in the context of the Pledge and its function in
the American Republic-a community with a history and composed of
real people with real beliefs.
And when we look at the question in this more realistic light, it is
quickly apparent that to equate "under God" with "under no God," for
example, is akin to asserting the identity of white and black. The Pledge,
after all, is a pledge of allegiance; but the phrase of negation, far from
expressing and eliciting the allegiance of the citizens, would amount to a
gratuitous insult to the beliefs held by a majority of Americans. Though
"under no God" might make the Pledge more attractive to a small minor-
ity, it would forfeit the loyalty of countless others, and thus would drasti-
cally undermine the purpose of the Pledge.
82. See Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2305-06 (describing brief history of Pledge).
Specifically, the Court notes that "the Pledge of Allegiance evolved as a common
public acknowledgement of the ideals that our flag symbolizes. Its recitation is a
patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity and pride in those principles."
Id.
83. Cf id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the pledge "does
not refer to a nation 'under Jesus' or 'under Vishnu,' but instead acknowledges
religion in a general way: a simple reference to a generic 'God'").
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By contrast, it may well be that a majority of Americans believes that
the Republic is in some sense "under Jesus." It is even imaginable that if
the question were put to a vote, a majority of Americans would elect to
include this more specific language in the Pledge (though I seriously
doubt this). Even so, from the perspective of the nonsectarian principle,
"under Jesus" is emphatically not identical to "under God," as the Newdow
court asserted. "Under Jesus" is a far more exclusive statement than
"under God." Moreover, it seems to be gratuitously exclusive because
even on the (perhaps debatable) assumption that most Americans have
been and are Christians, it is not clear how our political commitments-to
equality, to natural rights-depend on anything that is distinctively or ex-
clusively Christian.8 4 Probably the two statesmen and thinkers to whom
we most often appeal for almost prophetic statements of the meaning of
America have been Jefferson and Lincoln; and although deity or Providence
figure prominently and essentially in each man's thought, it is doubtful
that either was a Christian in any very secure and orthodox sense.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's claim of identity among the assertions
"under God," "under Jesus," "under Vishnu" and "under no god" is from
one perspective plausible; from another perspective the claim is preposter-
ous. I think the sense in which the claim is preposterous is the important
one. In any case, the difference helps to underscore the vital distinction
among principles that are often conflated. If any sort of order and hon-
esty is to be introduced into First Amendment jurisprudence, the confla-
tion needs to be corrected. We need to recover our "nonsectarian"
tradition from the notions of neutrality and secularity that have served to
subvert it.
84. Although Christianity has surely been historically important in the devel-
opment of Western commitments to values such as human rights and equality, it is
arguable that its political significance in promoting these commitments has de-
rived not so much from its distinctively Christian theology as from its capacity to
carry, support and develop a classical natural law tradition. See generally JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HoLD THESE TRUTHS (1960).
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